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agencies of the government from making legal searches and seizures
that are unreasonable. It seems as tho this must necessarily be the
extent of the immunity. People v. Mayen, 205 Pac. 435, p. 441. By
the federal exclusion rule a double immunity is given the people. One
against the legalization of a trespass, and the other affecting a rule of
evidence. There is no provision that after the trespass is committed
the evidence obtained in the course of the illegal act shall ;aot bd
admitted. 19 Ill. Law Review 307. It might be urged that the admis-
sion of the evidence condones the method of obtaining it. But how
can we sustain this argument in the face of the fact that the same
court will subsequently prosecute the officer for the illegal act and will
not recognize as a defense that the evidence was admitted in a prior
trial. The trespass is complete when the property is seized. The
government is not committing an illegal act. The individual is the
offender. "A criminal prosecution is more than a game In which the
government may be checkmated and the game lost merely because its
officers have not played according to rule." McGuire v. United, States,
273 U. S. 95, 99 (1927).
Finally, there is the fact that the federal exclusion rule violates a
rule of evidence, in permitting improper grounds for objections. State
v. Fahm, 53 N. D. 203, 205 N. W. 67, 69 (1925). This is not denied by
the courts that support the exclusion rule, and is affirmed by all the
great authorities on evidence. Wigmore on Evidence, sec. 2183, and
Greenleaf on Evidence, sec. 254a. It would appear then that the courts
would entertain some hesitancy in openly violating the rules of pro-
cedure laid down for them both by the common law and by their codes.
In light of the procedure in the federal courts and in those state
courts that adopt the exclusion rule, is it not strange that the greai
mass of laymen wonder at the total inadequacy of the American legal
system to cope with the present day prevalence of crime? It may be
that the constitutional guarantees discussed in this paper have yielded
benefits that were not deserved. "Neither of the amendments had a
genesis that can be said to have been prophetic of the great repute
they have come to enjoy. My impression is, that so many have been
the criminals who have worshipped at the shrine of the amendments,
and so seldom have honest and law-ablding men had occasion to seek
their protection, that their adulation by the law-breaker has given the
people at large a false conception of their proper breadth and com-
pass." Jno. C. Knott, 74 Pa. Law Review 141.
We must be cautious in granting a creature powers that will enable
it to be a thorn in the side of its creator, and vigilant to forestall a
protector against wielding a sword that wounds its master.
JAB. T. HATCEOM
CRIMEs-DUTY TO RETREAT "To THE WArt".-In the Kentucky case
of Gibson v. Com wnwealth, A was killed in a drunken brawl. B and
C along with D were convicted of manslaughter. The decision of the
134 S. W. 926 (1931).
S~u-aq NoTES 363
lower court requirea no statement of facts except that B and C claimed
that B shot A in self-defense. The problem of the case rests in the
lower court's instructions which said that the defendant must flee
from danger before the plea of self-defense was available.
The upper court held that one in a place of right need not retreat
but might defend himself when attacked by another with a deadly
weapon.
2
In a discussion of this problem the following two situations are ot
importance: first, where the person assailed is not on his own
premises; secondly, where the assailed is on his own premises, i. e.,
within the cartilage.
In regard to the first situation the orthodox rule in America Is
that when a person is attacked with a dangerous weapon he must
retreat as far as he can, or, according to the common law doctrine, he
must retreat "to the wall" before the right of killing the other is avail-
able to him.3 By this rule there is no necessity for killing as long as
there is an avenue of escape.
The rule is best expressed in the words of a Delaware court.5 The
court said: "The assailed must retreat from his assailant as far as
he can and never until he has done this unavailingly can he meet his
opponent and slay him. This is illustrated by the familiar instance
given of two men in a room and one assailing another to take his life,
or inflict great bodily injury as mentioned. In such a case, the assailed
must retreat as far as he can-be driven 'to the wall' as we say figura-
tively, before the final remedy for protection is accorded him. If life
or person can be protected in any other way than by taking life it
must be done or the homicidal act will be treated in law as a malicious
or murderous one."
There is one exception to the common law doctrine: namely, if
the assault upon a person is so great that the assaulted cannot retreat
because of manifest danger of death or great bodily harm, he may
kill his assailant. His act must be one of necessity.0
In a New York case the court said: "A person attacked is nut
bound to retreat if such would imperil his safety the more, or if a!
reasonable man under the circumstances would be justified in believing
'In reviewing this problem a difference should be noted between
a simple assault and a murderous attack. In the first instance the per-
son attacked may stand his ground and meet force with force, because
such resistance is not apt to lead to serious bodily harm.
State v. Blevin, 138 N. C. 668, 50 S. E. 763 (1904). As to simple
assault see 5 Wis. Law Review 500.
'21 Mich. Law Review 99, 18 A. L. R. 1279. State v. Brooks, 3
Boyce (Del.) 203, 84 AtI. 225 (1912).
S tate v. Lee, 92 Ala. 15, 9 So. 407 (1891); State v. Don, 27 N. W.
369 (1886).
State v. Walcer, 9 Houst. (Del.) 464, 33 Atl. 227 (1887).
'Com. v. Drum (1868), 58 Penn. 9.
'People v. Buecufurri (1913), 139 N. Y. Supp. 305. See also Stripiin
v. State (1911), 100 Ark. 132, 139 S. W. 1128, Wharton's Criminal Law,
Vol. 1, l1th Ed., p. 775.
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that to retreat would add to the danger." It is necessary that the
defendant actually believe that he was in danger, and if he retreated
it would add to the danger 8 It is not enough to show there were.
reasonable grounds for the belief. The bona fide existence of the
belief must be proved.9
Whether a person should retreat depends upon: (1) the sudden-
ness of the attack; (2) iminence of the danger; (3) violence of the
attack; (4) age and strength of the parties 0
The common law rule made the duty to retreat from a felonious
attack on the one hand and standing one's ground and meeting force
with force on the other, to depend upon whether or not the case was
one of excusable self-defense. Where there was no collateral felony
and it was felonious only because it involved an intent to kill or seri-
ously injure the person assaulted, it was a case of excusable self-defense.
The person assaulted was required to retreat "to the wall" before being
warranted in killing to defend himself. However, where there was a
collateral felony, other than the assault, as for example an intent to
rob, or the person was in the performance of an official duty, ib was
a case of justifiable self-defense, in which case it was the duty and
right of the person to stand his ground and meet force with force.
In a few jurisdictions the common law doctrine has been supS
planted by the "non-retreat" rule. If the person is in a place where
he has a right to be and is without fault and he is put in reasonably
apparent danger of losing his life or receiving great bodily harm, he
need not retreat. He may stand his ground and repel force with
force, even taking the life of his assailent if necessary?' This view Is
sometimes called the "Texas Rule" and is found expressed in the Texas
Statutes."
In an Oklahoma case,1 it was held improper to instruct the jury
that if the accused could have avoided that danger and the killing by
retreating it was his duty to do so, for the reason that when a person
is unlawfully attacked in a place where he has a right to be, he may
stand his ground and defend himself.1 4
In Kentucky the law is settled that under conditions filled with
risk of death or great bodily harm the person attacked need not retreat
at all in order to avail himself of the full right of self-defense 5
8Trogden v. State (1892), 133 Ind. 1, 32 N. E. 725; State v. Smith
(1892), 114 Mo. 406, 21 S. W. 827; Howard v. State (1896), 110 Ala. 92,
20 So. 365.
" Trogden v. State (1892), 133 Ind. 1.
"1People v. Garretson (N. Y.), 2 Wheeler Criminal Cases 347
(1825).
"Ball v. State (1890), 14 S. W. 1012; People v. Batcholder (1864),
27 Cal. 69; People v. Huker (1895), 109 Cal. 451.
"1 Vernon's Criminal Statutes 1914, Art. 1108.
"1Fowler v. State (1912), 8 Okla. Crim. Rep. 130, 126 Pac. 831.
14 See also Hammond v. People (1902), 54 Washington 210, 100 Pac.
309.
"Daugherty v. Com. (1914), 157 Ky. 348, 163 S. W. 453; Conner v.
Com. (1904), 118 Ky. 497.
STUDENT NoTEs
One may, in Kentucky, act upon reasonable fear of immediate
danger though the deceased made no hostile demonstration. The
extreme view of the Kentucky court may be seen in a quotation from
one opinion. The court said: "It is sufficient for this case to decide
that If the appellant had reason to apprehend that Miller would shoot
him unless he could shoot Miller first or run away, the law does not
require him to run and be shot in the back or be secretly assassinated
but justifies his taking of Miller's life and if he believed that Miller
was drawing a weapon to shoot him, the fact only being -that Miller
had no pistol but was maneuvering to make him run, can not make
him culpable for doing what he had a good reason to believe was neces-
sary for either the immediate or ultimate security of his life and if
the party once assailed by an enemy who had threatened to kill him is
bound by law to run if he can thereby escape that assailant, legal self-
defense may become a mockery and the sacred right itself a mockery
and a shadow. Like the sword of Damocles the danger is continually
impending everywhere. The threatened man may be waylaid or other-
wise attacked without the possibility of defense."
The federal courts seem to be divided upon the question. In
some of the decisions the "non retreat" rule has been followed.u The
Rowe case 9 was decided in November, while in December of the same
year In Allen v. U. S.0 the court said that the assailed was bound to
retreat.
In another federal case, the court held the defendant was bound to
retreat.2 On the other hand the Rowe case said that the defendant
was where he had a right to be and the law did not require him' to
step aside when his assailant was rapidly advancing with a deadly
weapon, and under the circumstances it was an error to make the case
depend in whole or in part upon the inquiry whether the accused could
by stepping aside have avoided the danger.
In regard to the second situation, it is the universal rule that one
on his own premises need not retreat.2 This rule comes to us from
the feudal days when a man's home was his castle.
Some courts have extended the rule to a person's place of busi-
ness. Others have extended the rule to a person's club rooms.2" As
to a person attacked while in pursuit of an illegal business one court-
said: "the illegality of a business does not abrogate the owner's right
In respect to self-defense, and if a man's place of business is as much
"Bohannon v. Com. (1871), 8 Bush 481.
"Beard v. U. S., 158 U. S. 555 (1895); Rowe v. U. S., 164 U. S.
546 (1896); Brown v. U. S., 256 U. S. 335 (1921).
2164 U. S. 546.
20 164 U. S. 492.
U. S. v. Lewis, 111 Fed. 631 (1901).
1 Jones v. State (1884), 76 Ala. 8; People v. Lewis (1897), 117 Cal.186.
"State v. Laura (1923), 93 W. Va. 240, 116 S. E. 251.
"State v. Marlowe (1922), 112 S. E. (S. C.) 921.
"Hil v. State (1915), 69 So. 941.
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his 'castle' as his dwelling house, he has, as against private persons, a
legal right there whether or not the business is unlawful." In another
case," the defendant conducted a bawdy house and the court said that
the house was his castle.
It has been mentioned2' that it is logical for the same rule to apply
to business houses as to the dwelling houses. The same reasons apply
to both. These observations are debatable. In the first place, the tra-
ditional "castle doctrine" as relating to a person's home would hardly
apply to his workshop. Secondly, man's domestic duty to protect his
family would not apply to his business house where he alone is present.
Thirdly, because a person is in his counting house does not necessitate
his standing ground and causing the destruction of his own or his
assailant's life.
Wharton2 says that a person in his own house may stand his
ground and is not bound to retreat, but if he is in another's home it Is
his duty to escape, and he is not excused for taking his assailant's life
if there is an avenue of escape.
The conclusions of the courts denying the "duty to retreat" rule
are based upon four grounds: 1. Rights of an individual cannot be
yielded to a wrongdoer. 2. It is a disgrace to retreat and throw
"honor" to the winds. 3. With the coming of firearms the rule is
unworkable. 4. Prevents the assailed from being protected from sub-
sequent assaults.
The "honor" theory is meaningless and beyond the law. The law
only allows one to protect his rights in accordance with the interests
of the state whose interests do not justify crime.
The days of the southwest cattle wars, saloon brawls and Kentucky
feuds are over. People who formerly went beyond the pale of law for
justice are discovering that the law gives them redress for violation
of their persons. An honorable and brave man may retreat and regret
it, but if he stands his ground and kills another there is greater chance
for regret.
In regard to the prevailing rule as applied to one's dwelling, it Is
an inheritance from the turbulent times when a retreat from the castle
meant an increase of peril and danger. Such a rule today Is unneces-
sary.
Blackstone summed up the true doctrine when he said: "and
though it may be cowardice in time of war between two independent
nations to flee from an enemy, yet as between two fellow subjects the
law countenances no such point of honor." However, it seems that the
tendency of the American courts is towards the establishment of the
"non retreat" rule."
CLRNCE ROTEN13TInG.
"People v. Rector, N. Y. (1838), 19 Wend. 569.
12 Ia. L. Rev. 172.
2
'Wharton's Crim. Law, 3rd Ed. (1907), p. 481.
4 Bl. Com. 185.
,o21 Mich. Law Review 99.
